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Private Police Forces: Legal Powers
and Limitations
Although concern over the conduct and control of public police activ-
ities has provoked extensive discussion among legal commentators,1 the
literature has largely ignored the role of private police.2 However, the
rapid growth of the private police industry3 and the incursion of this
industry into areas normally associated .tith public law enforcement 4
raise important questions concerning the conduct and control of pri-
vate police activities.
It is difficult to generalize about the private police industry.5 Diver-
sification exists not only in the degree of training and professionalism
1 E.g., M. BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY (1964); A. BLACK, THE PEOPLE
AND THE POLICE (1968); P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEw YORK CrrY
(1969); J. SKOLNICK, JUsTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAw ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SocIETY
(1966).
2 The only previous treatment of this subject in a legal periodical appears in Note,
Regulation of Private Police, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 540 (1967).
As used in this comment, the term "private police" refers to individuals or organiza-
tions who perform protective or investigative services for profit or in connection with
other business, and who are not public employees engaged in the exercise of their official
duties. This definition includes such groups as armored car agencies, private detective
agencies, special patrol agencies, retail security guards, plant protection units, industrial
security units, and campus security guards. The one significant group that does not fit this
definition is the citizen volunteer patrol.
3 It has been estimated that $1.6 billion was spent by the private sector for protective
services in 1969. Creeping Capitalism, FORBES, Sept. 1, 1970, at 22 [hereinafter cited as
FORBES]. "The security industry itself claims that two out of every three law enforcement
officers in the nation are actually on private payrolls." Id. at 22.
4 Some private police agencies, structured along the lines of city police forces, have
begun to provide patrol car and guard services to neighborhood groups and urban cor-
porations. FoRnEs, supra note 3, at 22.
5 Much of the information set forth in this comment is based on interviews conducted
in Chicago, Illinois, from September, 1970, to January, 1971. In many instances interviews
were refused, and in other instances the interviewee declined to have his name or firm
associated with his remarks. Very few interviews were conducted with small private in-
vestigators or private guards. Thus, the reader should note that the generalizations ex-
pressed concerning private police activities relate primarily to the larger agencies. For
discussions of the small-scale operators, see REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIvE
COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND LICENSURE OF PRIVATE DETECTIVES 43-60
(1957) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON PRIVATE DrEcTIvEs (1957)]; REPORT OF THE NEW
YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND LICENSURE OF
PRIVATE DETECTIVES 43-48 (1958) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON PRIVATE DrECrIVEs (1958)].
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of particular private policemen," but in the particular role for which
they are employed.7 Although private police perform numerous func-
tions, including the provision of armored car, patrol, and investigation
services, they are used most extensively as uniformed guards in indus-
trial and retail settings.8 Within these settings private police may serve
a variety of purposes, including: the protection of property and persons
from theft, fire, and other destructive events; the investigation and sur-
veillance of employees to prevent pilferage and embezzlement; the
maintenance of company order and the enforcement of rules and regu-
lations; and the collection of information to influence business, legal,
or personal decisions.9
These functions indicate that private police are oriented primarily
toward prevention and protection, and not toward general law enforce-
ment.10 The private interests that spawned the use of private police
6 "To an extent of which the public is perhaps unaware, licensed private detectives
often engage men of scant ability and little stability. While generalization is impossible,
we have been struck by the sporadic, short term, and poorly paid nature of much of the
employment in this occupational group." REPORT ON PRIVATE DrETaIvEs (1957),. supra
note 5, at 53. While this description is perhaps overly broad, the qualifications and train-
ing of private police do seem to reflect a relatively low level of responsibility. For
example, the starting wage in Chicago, Illinois, for a security guard is $1.95 per hour.
A high rate of job turn-over also characterizes many private police activities. Most
training is on-the-job; the typical security guard will begin work with, at most, an
orientation lecture. In other areas, however, training seems to be quite extensive. See,
e.g., R. SENG & J. GILMouR, BRINK'S: Tm MONEY MovERs 71 (1959). Investigators who have
received top security clearance by the federal government are often trained in the full
range of police techniques. The supervisory personnel of many private police agencies
are well paid and well trained, and often have backgrounds in public law enforcement.
Thus, no single label adequately fits the range of expertise prevalent in this field.
Variations in the size and sophistication of private police operations are equally great.
There are three corporate giants in the field-Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc.,
The William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., and The Wackenhut Corpora-
tion. The largest, Pinkerton's, Inc., employs upwards of 25,000 field personnel. Interview
with Edward Costells, Assistant Manager of the Chicago office, Pinkerton's National
Detective Agency, Inc., in Chicago, IIl., Nov. 25, 1970. However, most holders of private
detective licenses are either lone operators or small agencies which may employ fewer
than fifteen people on a full time basis. REPORT ON PRIVATE DErEcrTvas (1958), supra
note 5, at 47.
7 "Not only is there variety in the kinds of jobs done but also there is great specializa-
tion within well-known categories. One licensee is devoted to investigations in the
perfume industry. Another serves exclusively a 'clientele of railroads, steamship lines
and common carriers.' One corporation is devoted to observing and reporting 'instances
of taxi drivers carrying passengers without recording the fare on their meters."' RxoarT
ON PIVATE DEr P-rvzs (1958), supra note 5, at 46.
8 Of the estimated 800,000 private police officers, approximately 500,000 are uniformed.
FoRBEs, supra note 3, at 22.
9 For a more comprehensive listing, see R. MOMBOISSE, INDusRIL SECuRry FoR STRIK.s,
RioTs AND DIsAsrTEs 52-54 (1968).
10 See, e.g., TIh WLIAm J. BurNs INT'L Drxcrrnv AGENCIY, INC., HANDBOOK FOR
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rarely seem to require, or tolerate, a wholesale displacement of public
police forces. Thus, to avoid possible adverse public relations and po-
tential tort liability, security guards are typically instructed to utilize
public police whenever possible in matters touching the public domain,
particularly arrests and searches. 1 In some situations, however, private
police must exercise powers analogous to those of their public counter-
parts.12 Retail security guards, for example, regularly arrest, search, in-
terrogate, and seek criminal prosecution of suspected shoplifters.'3 This
comment explores the extent of these private police powers to arrest,
search, and interrogate, and examines the adequacy of existing and
potential controls on the exercise of these powers.
I. GENERAL LEGAL FRAmEWORK
Every citizen possesses certain common law and statutory powers of
arrest, 4 search and seizure,'5 and self-defense. 1 The private policeman
enjoys these powers no less than any other individual. The question
remains, however, whether private police are authorized to exercise
powers greater than those granted to citizens generally. Although
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia require licenses for cer-
GuARDs (1962) [hereinafter cited as BUENs HANDBOOK]. "The protection of a plant by a
guard unit is primarily preventive." Id. at 8 (emphasis in original).
11 "Whenever possible, have a law enforcement officer make the arrest, but if no law
enforcement officer is available and an arrest is necessary, make sure that the law en-
forcement authorities are contacted immediately." Id. at 16.
12 Some agencies provide private police services which parallel or supplant public
police forces. See note 4 supra. The parallel to public police forces is most dearly seen
in campus security forces. As indicated in text at note 27 infra, many campus security
police enjoy full police officer powers while engaged in the performance of their duties.
These duties often include full scale patrolling of both private and public grounds.
Where public police are allocated on the basis of crime rate, and to the extent campus
security police are effective, the result may be that the campus security forces supplant
the public police within a limited geographical area.
The desire to prevent and deter destructive acts may also invite a direct involvement
in law enforcement and the criminal process: "Some advocate criminal prosecution for
all thefts, but most [employers of industrial police] prosecute only the big ones, Never-
theless, all agree that occasional prosecution is a good deterrent to future crime." R.
MoBossE, supra note 9, at 409. The decision to prosecute may also be influenced by
other factors. In retail security these include the amount of the theft, the attitude of
the shoplifter, and the degree of recidivism. Interview with a Director of Retail Security,
in Chicago, Ill., Jan. 6, 1971 (name withheld by request).
13 See note 12 supra.
14 See text at notes 34-45 infra.
15 See text at notes 69-76 infra.
16 See generally REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS §§ 63-75; 1 F. HmImn & F. JAMES,
THE LAw OF TORTS § 3.11 (1956). The citizen also possesses certain other related rights
concerning defense of third parties, defense of unlawful intrusion upon property, and
defending dispossession of real and personal property. Id. §§ 3.12-.16.
1971]
The University of Chicago Law Review [Vol. 38:555
tain private police activities,' 7 these licenses generally confer no addi-
tional powers.'5 At most the licensing statutes merely regulate the quali-
fications of licensees' 9 and their employees, 20 and in some cases impose
restrictions on the conduct of certain private police activities. 2' How-
17 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7500-83 (as amended, Supp. 1970); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 24, §§ 1301-21 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 201-1 to 201-51 (Smith-Hurd
1964); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 70 to 89-a.
In addition, some municipalities require adherence to their own licensing provisions.
E.g., Los ANrLEs, CAL. CODE § 21.117 (1946). In other cases, the state statute auth6rizes
certain classes of municipalities to regulate and license private detectives. E.g., Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 73.110(17), 75.110(18), 84.340, 84.720 (1952). However, some state licensing statutes
prohibit further licensing by any political subdivision of the state. E.g., MicH. STAT. ANN.
§ 18.185(5) (Supp. 1970).
The coverage and exemptions of these statutes vary considerably. Most of the states
require licensing of both private detectives and private patrolmen, although occasionally
the statutes are broader, and may include, for example, a "repossessor," NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 648.015 (1967), or a polygraph operator, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 147, § 22(1) (1965). Typical
exemptions include officers of federal, state, and local governments, deputies and special
police while on duty, insurance adjusters, practicing attorneys, and any person employed
exclusively in connection with the affairs of his employer. The exemption for private
police employed exclusively in connection with the affairs of their employers effectively
excludes from coverage a majority of retail and industrial guards. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 66-49.2(2)(d) (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 25 (1955). This exemption has been ex-
plained in terms of ". . . [t]he employer's self-advantage in selecting trustworthy em-
ployees and in supervising their work . RE. " PORT ON PRiVATE DEamavs (1957), supra
note 5, at 46. On the licensing statutes see generally id. at 101-17 (statutes as of 1957).
18 See, e.g., License of Niehoff, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 410, 48 Berks County L.J. 286 (1956);
Doherty v. Lester, 4 Misc. 2d 741, 159 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1957). But cf. Frank v. Wabash R.R.,
295 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1956).
Occasionally the statutes grant some limited power, such as the right to carry a night-
stick, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.185(19)(4) (Supp. 1970), or a non-concealed deadly weapon, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 67-33-44 (Supp. 1969). On the other hand, some of the statutes specifically
deny certain powers, such as entering on private property without consent, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 67-33-25(F) (Supp. 1969), or inducing a criminal confession by coercion or reward,
CoLo. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1-10 (1963).
19 Among the most common qualifications are general provisions as to "honesty,
competency, integrity and trustworthiness," a clean criminal record with respect to felonies
and other specified crimes, and some prior law enforcement experience. E.g., N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAw § 72(l); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 14(a) (1955). Sometimes the applicant must
pass a written examination. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 201-6A(g) (Smith-Hurd 1964).
Character references may also be required. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-49.3(b)(5) (1965).
However, training requirements are rare. But see Micii. STAT. ANN. § 18.185(31) (Supp.
1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9507(5) (Supp. 1970).
20 Persons employed by a licensee are often required to register with the licensing
authority, which usually entails submitting fingerprints and a photograph to the licensing
authority. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 201-10b (Smith-Hurd 1964). See generally REPoRT
ON PRiVATE DETEcTnvEs (1957), supra note 5, at 52-53.
21 The principal restriction is the furnishing of a bond by the licensee to assure "the
faithful and honest conduct of... business by the applicant." The bond is usually avail-
able to "any person injured by the violation of any of the provisions of [the licensing
statute], or by the willful, malicious and wrongful act of the principal or employe." PA,
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 16(a) (1955). See also Myles v. Meinecke, 82 Ohio App. 126, 78 N.E.2d
917 (1948). The bonds may range anywhere from $1,000 to $25,000, although most average
$5,000 or less for individuals and $10,000 or less for agencies.
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ever, in addition to licensing, some states and municipalities deputize,
or "commission," private watchmen and guards.22 Typically, the com-
mission vests the recipient with some or all of the powers of a public
police officer during such hours and upon such premises as the com-
mission may prescribe.23 In turn, the commission may require the re-
cipient to adhere to the rules, regulations, and practices of the local
police department. 24 A commission, unlike a license, is not a prerequi-
site to engage in private police activities, and comparatively few private
police appear to operate under a commission.25 Finally, some states
grant special powers, generally concerning arrest and search, to private
police who are employed in connection with the affairs of certain cate-
gories of employers. Railroad detectives, 26 campus security officers,27
and retail security guards28 are often granted such additional powers.
In most states, however, the majority of private police seem to possess
no powers beyond those of the ordinary citizen.
Abuses in the exercise of private police power are presently controlled
by three factors: license revocation, criminal prosecution, and tort
liability. The impact of license revocation appears minimal. In gen-
eral, outside complainants initiate revocation proceedings. 29 Except
perhaps for the overcharged client, a complainant usually has little to
22 "It is a common practice in this country for private watchmen or guards to be
vested with the powers of policemen, sheriffs or peace officers to protect the private
property of their private employers." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S.
416, 429 (1946). See also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 98 (1951).
Some statutes permit the governor or some state agency to vest private police with
special powers relative to the enforcement of particular state laws. E.g., ME. R v. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 3801-02 (1965) (the governor may vest 50 private detectives with the
arrest powers of a sheriff for the enforcement of laws relating to shoplifting, gambling,
larceny, embezzlement, stolen goods, and certain misfeasance by state officers). Actually
such statutes would appear to create a special state police force composed of private
detectives. Commissioning, however, is aimed at protecting private interests.
23 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 60-70 (1965); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.185(30) (Supp.
1970); R.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 74A-1, 74A-2 (1969); CHICAGO, ILL., CODE ch. 173 (1970); NEw
YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 434a-7.0 (1963).
24 E.g., HoUsToN, TEx., CODE § 30-74 (1958) ('Special officers shall at all times be
subject to orders and instructions of ranking officers of the police department.'). See also
Frank v. Wabash R.R., 295 S.W.2d 16, 20, 21 (Mo. 1956).
25 Private police agencies usually have their men commissioned only upon the request
of the client. The reasons for this appear to be twofold. First, the commission is usually
limited to a specific address, and cannot be transferred when the guard is re-assigned.
Second, many agency executives feel that the added powers conferred by a commission
are not essential to the limited responsibilities of a security guard.
26 E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 183 (1964); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-341 (1966).
27 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 7-112 to -120 (Supp. 1969) (state institutions); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 144, § 28 (Smith-Hurd 1964) (University of Illinois); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 147, § 10G
(Supp. 1969) (state and private institutions); Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5891A-1
(Supp. 1969) (private institutions).
28 D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-115 (1966); and see notes 44-45 infra.
29 See REPORT ON PRIVATE DavEcTvas (1957), supra note 5, at 54.
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gain from a revocation hearing, and where highly personal matters are
involved, perhaps much to lose.30 As a result, complaints are seldom
filed and revocation is rare.31 Thus, the legal burden of controlling
private police conduct seems to rest on criminal and civil sanctions.
Although it is unlikely that these remedies deter public police miscon-
duct, certain factors suggest that they might be more effective against
private police.32 The remaining sections of this comment examine the
efficacy of these and other possible sanctions for controlling abuses of
private police power in the areas of arrest, search, and interrogation.
II. ARREST
A. The Power to Arrest
An arrest is the apprehension of a criminal suspect for the purpose
of bringing him before a public official to answer a criminal charge.3 3
Although private investigations and industrial security work may some-
times culminate in a private police arrest, the incidence of arrest is
probably highest in the retail security context.3 4 Where time does not
permit the security guard to summon public police, he must often arrest
the suspect himself. Such arrests are necessarily without the protection
of a warrant, and where the security guard is not deputized, the power
to arrest normally depends on the common law and statutory authori-
zation of citizen's arrest.
Under the common law, citizens and public police officers possessed
apparently similar powers to make arrests without a warrant. 5 Misde-
meanant arrests were permitted only to preserve the public peace, and
30 "One must suspect that those who may have been pursued by private detectives are
not eager thereafter to prolong the acquaintance by pressing complaints i.ith the licensing
authority." Id. at 41.
31 "[C]omplaints against licensees [in New York State] average only a half dozen a year,
and the disposition of them has been uniformly in favor of the licensee. Moreover, these
complaints come from dissatisfied clients, rather than from harassed subjects of investiga-
tion." Id.
Where disciplinary action is administered, the action may amount to little more than a
short term suspension of the license. For example, in Agency for Investigation and Detec-
tion, Inc. v. Dep't of State, 25 App. Div. 2d 738, 739, 169 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169 (1966), the
licensee "acted in a shocking and most callous disregard of law and the rights of indi-
viduals" when he broke into a private dwelling and "pushed, shoved and committed acts
amounting to assaults" upon the occupants. The court affirmed a two-month suspension
of his license.
82 See text as notes 52-64 infra.
83 See generally Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REv. 201 (1940).
34 During one twelve-month period the member stores of New York City's Store's
Mutual Protective Association apprehended nearly 10,000 suspected shoplifters. S. CURs,
MODERN RETAIL SactmrrY 779-82 (1960), as cited in Note, Regulation of Private Police, 40
S. CAL. L. REv. 540, 541 n.11 (1967).
35 See generally Perkins, supra note 33; Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Micir.
L. REv. 541 (f924); Note, The Law of Citizen's Arrest, 65 COLUmn. L. Rv. 502 (1965).
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the law required an actual breach86 of the peace committed in the pres-
ence37 of the arresting party. Felony arrests were permitted whenever a
felony had actually been committed and there was reasonable cause to
believe in the suspect's guilt.3 In addition, to supplement the arrest
power, the arrestor was permitted to employ force if necessary, 9 and
to detain the arrestee for such time as was reasonably required to de-
liver him to an appropriate public official.40
Although many states have expanded the arrest powers of public
police officers,4 1 the scope of permissible citizen's arrest, and the atten-
dant powers of force and detention, have remained relatively constant.4 2
The breach of the peace requirement, however, has been eliminated in
the context of most citizen misdemeanant arrests,43 and shoplifting stat-
utes,4 4 which allow merchants to "detain" a suspect when reasonable
38 E.g., Commonwealth v. Wright, 158 Mass. 149, 158-59 (1893) (peace officer); Radloff
v. National Food Stores, Inc., 20 Wis. 2d 224, 123 N.W.2d 570 (1963) (citizen). Because
not all misdemeanors constitute a breach of the peace-petit larceny, for example--an
arrest without a warrant may be unlawful even though the suspect is guilty.
37 E.g., Lynn v. Weaver, 251 Mich. 265, 231 N.W. 579 (1930) (peace officer); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925) (citizen).
88 In some instances, however, a public police officer was permitted to arrest a suspected
felon whenever he had reasonable cause to believe a felony had been committed. See
Perkins, supra note 33, at 233-38.
39 See generally Note, Justification for the Use of Force in the Criminal Law, 13 STAN.
L. REV. 566 (1961). A citizen is generally entitled to use whatever force is necessary to
make the arrest. Id. at 569. However, deadly force may be employed only to apprehend
an escaping felon. See, e.g., People v. Lathrop, 49 Cal. App. 63, 192 P. 722 (1920). Some
authorities have urged that the power to use deadly force in a felony arrest should be
limited to public police officers. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b)(ii), Comment at 58
(rent. Draft No. 8, 1958). In any event, a citizen or private policeman is not authorized
to use more force than a public police officer. Berryman v. Int'l Paper Co., 139 So. 2d
806 (La. App. 1962).
40 As a rule, the suspect must be taken without unnecessary delay before the ap-
propriate authorities. E.g., Cline v. Tait, 116 Mont. 571, 155 P.2d 752 (1945) (peace officer);
Singerman v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 219 App. Div. 291, 219 N.Y.S.
724 (1927) (citizen). Moreover, ". . . imprisonment or detention beyond the reasonable
time not only renders the imprisonment or detention illegal, but makes the entire trans-
action (including the arrest) a trespass ab initio." Great American Indemnity Co. v.
Beverly, 150 F. Supp. 134, 140 (M.D. Ga. 1956).
41 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 836; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2(c) (Smith-Hurd 1970);
N.Y. CODE CInM. PROC. § 177; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-251, -253 (1962). These statutes gen-
erally permit public police officers to arrest any suspect without a warrant whenever there
is probable cause to believe in the suspect's guilt, or to believe that the suspect com-
mitted a crime in the officer's presence.
42 However, in Nebraska and Wyoming, citizens apparently enjoy greater powers of
arrest in cases of petit larceny than do the public police officers. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-402
(1943); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-156 (1959).
43 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 837; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-3 (Smith-Hurd 1970); N.Y.
CODE CRuM. PROC. § 183; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-251, -252 (1962).
44 See generally Note, Survey and Analysis of Criminal and Tort Aspects of Shoplifting
Statutes, 58 MICH. L. REv. 429 (1960).
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cause exists, 45 have reduced to some extent the impact of the presence
requirement.
The limited powers of citizen's arrest seem sufficient to permit pri-
vate police to fulfill their protective functions. Although the principal
limitation on the general power of citizen's arrest-the presence re-
quirement for misdemeanant arrests-might have posed a serious re-
striction on retail security, since the guard is rarely present during the
theft, the shoplifting statutes have largely eliminated this difficulty. In
other private police contexts, either the arresting guard is present dur-
ing the commission of the crime, or the crime constitutes a felony, and
hence presence is not required.46
B. Adequacy of Sanctions for Abuse of Arrest Power
Perhaps because the arrest powers of private police are sufficiently
broad in those areas where arrests are likely, private police agencies
appear to stay well within the legal standards of arrest.47 Some agencies
require adherence to even stricter arrest standards than the law re-
quires.48 This restraint may be due in part to the sensitivity of these
45 The statutes normally provide that the detention shaU be effected in a reasonable
manner and for a reasonable length of time. They also specify the purpose of the deten-
tion. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 34(l) (1959) (to effect recovery of the goods); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 10-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970) (to investigate ownership of the goods);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 94-B (Supp. 1971) (to question the suspect); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 629.365, 629.366 (Supp. 1971) (to deliver the suspect to a peace officer); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2935.041 (Baldwin 1964) (to cause an arrest to be made by a police officer). The
statutes normally state that such detention shall not constitute an arrest, although the
distinction apparently has no practical significance, other than to limit liability of the
merchant. In addition, the statutes sometimes provide special defenses for the merchant
or his agents in civil and criminal actions for false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault
and battery.
46 In cases where private police investigations culminate in an arrest, some agencies
indicate that their usual practice is to delay the arrest until they can apprehend the
suspect in the act. Interview with Guido Mattei, Regional Manager of Burns Detective
Agency, Inc., in Chicago, Ill., Jan. 8, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Burns Interview].
47 See note 46 supra.
48 See, e.g., BuRNs HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 17:
A guard without police authority has only the power to arrest which the ordinary
citizen has. That is, he may arrest a person under the following conditions:
(a) The guard sees the person commit a felony. (b) The guard has reason to
believe a felony was committed and that the person being arrested has com-
mitted it. (c) If a person is charged with a felony and the guard knows a warrant
has been issued, he can arrest the offender without having the warrant in his
possession.
These standards are, in one sense, more restrictive than the law of citizen's arrest, because
they would allow only felony arrests. However, the Handbook is apparently mistaken
when it would allow a felony arrest in the (b) situation above, where there is reason to
believe a felony had been committed. Under the common law an actual commission of a
felony was required, and only two states seem to have broadened citizen powers to
include reasonable belief as to the commission of a felony. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43404
(1964); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.04 (Baldwin 1964).
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agencies to potentially adverse public relations, since to further its busi-
ness interests the private police industry must promote an image of
restraint and professionalism.49 However, abuses of arrest power do
occur, and in cases involving armed private police 0 the injury has some-
times been substantial. 51
The principal legal restraints on private police abuse of the arrest
power are civil and criminal liability for false arrest,52 false imprison-
ment,53 and assault and battery.5 4 Although criminal sanctions are rarely
invoked to punish such abuses,55 and the threat of prosecution is there-
fore unlikely to affect private police arrest conduct, the potential for
civil liability appears to deter most illegal arrest practices.
It is generally agreed that civil liability is an ineffective deterrent to
public police abuse.56 This may not be true, however, in the private
49 One impetus behind enactment of the private police licensing statutes was provided
by private police themselves, principally the larger firms, who desired to give their industry
a reputable image. Burns Interview, supra note 46. And the desire continues:
This [New York State Committee] has heard suggestions from within the ranks
of licensed private detectives for new educational requirements, for qualifying
examinations, and for transfer of licensing authority from the Department of
State to the Board of Regents-all for the purpose of establishing the private
detective as a "professional man."
REPORT ON PRIVATE DETECTIVEs (1957), supra note 5, at 50.
50 It is impossible to estimate what percentage of private police activities are conducted
under arms. Agencies appear to arm their men only at the request of the client, or when
the assignment is inherently dangerous. Apparently all armored car messengers carry
arms. Retail security personnel, other than uniformed patrol guards, are not, in general,
armed. The arming of industrial security guards seems to depend on the ". .. type of
security interest involved, the number and kind of persons employed at the plant, and
the character of the community or area in which the plant is located." R. MomBossE,
supra note 9, at 43.
51 E.g., People v. Silver, 16 Cal. 2d 714, 108 P.2d 4 (1940) (night watchman killed a
youth who had trespassed for the purpose of stealing gasoline); Myles v. Meineke, 82
Ohio App. 126, 78 N.E.2d 917 (1948) (plaintiff wrongfully shot by a private guard);
Doherty v. Lester, 4 Misc. 2d 741, 159 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1957) (private detective shot and
seriously wounded a nineteen-year-old suspect).
52 E.g., Martin v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App. 421, 181 S.W.2d 638
(1944); Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 409 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1966).
53 E.g., Meinecke v. Skaggs, 123 Mont. 308, 213 P.2d 237 (1949); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 136 S.W.2d 759 (1940).
54 E.g., Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, 1 So. 2d 510 (1941); Greenfield v. Colonial
Stores, Inc., 110 Ga. App. 572, 139 S.E.2d 403 (1964).
55 Successful criminal prosecutions against public police officers are practically non-
existent: "It is absurd to suggest that any district attorney, or superior officer, is going to
take criminal action against one of his subordinates." White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727,
737, 235 P.2d 209, 215-16 (1951) (Carter, J., dissenting). Similarly, it appears that successful
criminal prosecutions against private police are rare. Burns Interview, supra note 46.
50 "The fact is, however, that there are several million illegal arrests and imprisonments
in the United States each year, and that only a handful of damage suits are filed against
policemen." Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 152 (1953).
See generally Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN.
L. Rv. 493 (1955).
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police context. Although public and private policemen are often judg-
ment proof, 7 liability insurance carried by employers of private police
and bonding requirements of most state licensing statutes may create a
limited fund from which to satisfy claims against private police.58 More-
over, the potential pro-defendant bias in suits against public police-
men59 may play a lesser role in suits involving private police. Finally,
while sovereign immunity often precludes suits against states and mu-
nicipalities, 60 the doctrine of respondeat superior generally enables
plaintiffs to proceed against the employer of private police.61 Those
few cases which take a narrow view of respondeat superior appear un-
sound.62
In practice, suits against private police are quite common 3 and often
57 See Hall, supra note 56, at 153-54; Greenstone, Liability of Police Officers for
Misuse of Their Weapons, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 397 (1967). The low salary of an
individual guard probably shields him from any substantial judgment. See note 6 supra.
58 Although these bonds are generally available to injured third parties, their effective-
ness is limited both by their relatively small size, and by the numerous exemptions to
the bonding requirements. See notes 17 & 21 supra. It is suggested that all private police
who carry arms should furnish a bond, whether or not they are required to be licensed,
and that the size of the bond should reflect the use of dangerous weapons. Cf. Myles
v. Meineke, 82 Ohio App. 126, 78 N.E.2d 917 (1948). Public police are sometimes required
to furnish bonds. See Greenstone, supra note 57, at 397 n.1.
59 "[A] current of sympathy for the police has begun to run through law-abiding
segments of all communities in grateful recognition of the dangers and pressures to which
these men daily expose themselves." Manos, Police Liability for False Arrest or Imprison-
ment, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 415, 427 (1967). Two members of this law-abiding segment
have advocated civil immunity for all police activities performed in the course of duty,
Jones & Mathes, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in
Damage Actions, 53 GEo. L.J. 889 (1965).
60 See generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1963); Note, Municipal Immunity in Police Torts, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rxv.
448 (1967). Although this doctrine appears to be undergoing steady erosion-see, e.g.,
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957)-it is notable that, under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, recovery for false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, and battery
is expressly excluded. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1964).
61 See cases cited at notes 52-54 supra. Moreover, at least one case has suggested that
recovery may be permitted against the client of a private police agency, even though the
service contract specifically provided that the agency would assume full responsibility for
the private police operations. Komorowski v. Boston Store, 263 Ill. App. 88, 93-96 (1931).
62 Liability is normally imputed to the employer of a private policeman for those
acts which occur within the scope of the employment. In determining this scope,
courts sometimes test whether the activity was in furtherance of the employer's interests.
See, e.g., Mackie v. Ambassador Hotel & Inv. Corp., 123 Cal. App. 215, 11 P.2d 3 (1932).
In Mackie the court held that, although the arrest furthered the employer's interests,
the subsequent illegal detention did not, and hence the employer could not be held
liable. The test should be expanded to include all acts performed in connection with the
private policeman's employment-that is, all acts performed during duty hours and on
duty premises-and should not depend on whether, in fact, an individual act benefited
the employer.
63 One agency executive has estimated that in practically every case of unfriendly
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successful. And the profit orientation of private police agencies and
their employers makes them particularly sensitive to large damage
awards.64 Thus, in view of the moderation generally exercised by pri-
vate police in arrest situations, existing civil and criminal sanctions
seem adequate to deter abuse of the arrest power.
III. SEARCH
A. The Power to Search
A private policeman may desire to conduct a search65 for a variety of
reasons. In the retail security context, the private guard may wish to
search the person of an apprehended shoplifter to recover stolen prop-
erty66 or to collect evidence for use either in a criminal prosecution or
in defense of a civil suit for false arrest. Searches would also be useful
in other areas of private police activity, particularly private investiga-
tion and industrial security. These could include search of a car or
dwelling for pilfered goods or the use of electronic surveillance de-
vices67 to obtain information for use in making legal, business, or per-
contact between his operatives and the general public---such as ejecting an unruly patron
at a sporting event-a civil suit ensued. Burns Interview, supra note 46. See also R.
MOMBOISSE, supra note 9, at 414.
64 Although in many illegal arrests by private police the harm may be little more than
dignitary, juries have often returned substantial verdicts. E.g., National Food Stores, Inc.
v. Utley, 303 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1962) ($10,000); Burke v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 267
F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1959) ($2,250); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Medline, 104 F.2d 485
(4th Cir. 1939) ($3,000); Gibson v. J.C. Penney Co., 165 Cal. App. 640, 331 P.2d 1057
(1958) -(5,00).
05 "Search" includes the following: (I) search of the person, including an area within
his reach, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), his clothing and external patting
thereof, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and the surface and orifices of the body, includ-
ing fingerprinting and taking of blood, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966);
(2) search of private property, including vehicles, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925); and (3) surveillance, including wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and the use of spies or informers, Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
The literature on public police search and seizure is voluminous. Particularly useful is
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMFNT PRoCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1970) [hereinafter cited
as MCPP No. 3]. For a listing of authorities on the subject, see L. WExNREB, CRaIMNAL
PRocEss 764-68 (1969).
66 E.g., People v. Santiago, 53 Misc. 2d 264, 278 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Rockland County Ct.
1967).
67 Electronic surveillance or wiretapping is a form of search, and its use, like other
forms of search, must conform to the strictures of the fourth amendment when engaged
in by governmental authorities. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See generally Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. Cr. REv. 133; Kitch, The Supreme Court's Code of Crim-
inal Procedure: 1968-1969 Edition, 1969 Sup. CT. R v. 155, 188-90; Note, From Private
Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43
N.Y.U.L. REv. 968 (1968).
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sonal decisions. In the absence of consent,68 however, it appears that
there is little legal authority for most forms of private search.
Surveillance by private parties, in the form of wiretapping, electronic
eavesdropping, or interception of any oral or wire communication
without consent, is almost entirely prohibited by Title III of the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 69 A number of states have
also enacted legislation outlawing private wiretapping or electronic
eavesdropping.70 Similarly, a private search of a building or vehicle
without consent is generally prohibited,71 unless incident to an arrest.72
68 The law on consent search has developed primarily in the public police field. The
courts generally require that waiver of fourth amendment rights be made voluntarily,
and impose a rather strict burden of proof on the prosecution to show voluntariness.
Johnson v. United States, 833 U.S. 10 (1948); Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th
Cir. 1960). See generally MCPP No. 8, §§ 4.01-.03, Comments at 51-57. In the private
police context the issue of voluntary consent might arise on a motion to suppress evidence
if a statute provides for exclusion, see text at notes 98-100 infra, or as a defense to a suit
for trespass or invasion of privacy. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 18, § 112 at 850-51
(Sd ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 167-84.
Moreover, a minority of federal courts have held that the principles announced in
Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 436 (1966), which established strict standards for waiver of
fifth and sixth amendment rights, require advising a suspect of his fourth amendment
right to require a search warrant and waiver of that right by the suspect before a valid
consent to a search may be obtained. United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir.
1966); United States v. Moderacki, 280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968); contra, United States
ex rel. Harris v. Hendricks, 423 F.2d 1096 (3d Cir. 1970). See generally Note, Consent
Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 130 (1967); Note,
Constitutional Law-Miranda v. Arizona and the Fourth Amendment, 46 N.C.L. REV.
142 (1967). Analogously, private police might be required (though not on constitutional
grounds) to advise a suspect of his right to refuse to allow a search. Failure to do so
could be per se evidence of non-consent, either for the purpose of evidence exclusion or
for imposition of tort liability on the private policeman for illegal search.
69 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-11 (1964). Only oral communications "uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation" fall within the purview of the Act. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(2) (1964). This language was intended to conform to the standards set out in Katz.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2161-63, 2178 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].
70 See StBcoMm. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., LAwS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING
(Comm. Print 1966), for a listing of state statutes in effect in 1966. In contrast to the
federal statute, some of the state statutes enforce blanket prohibitions on all unconsented-
to eavesdropping. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 653i (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14-1
-2 (Smith-Hurd 1970). See also AMERICAN BAR ASs'N, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (rent. Draft, 1968).
71 The only conceivable support for a nonconsensual private search of a building or
vehicle is an old common law property right, which granted the owner of personal prop-
erty or his agent the right to enter upon the land of one who had wrongfully taken such
property and return it to his own possession. The right has also seen some use in the
shoplifting context. However, reasonable mistake as to the culprit or presence of stolen
property was usually no defense to a later suit in trespass brought by the victim of
the search. W. PROSSER, supra note 68, at § 22, pp. 119-20; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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Search of a person by a private citizen appears to be limited to search
incident to a lawful arrest or detention, though much of the authority
for this right is ambiguous. Statutes in at least nine states allow any
person making an arrest to seize weapons "about the person" of the
arrested party and to deliver them to a magistrate.73 Two states autho-
rize a personal search and seizure not only of offensive weapons, but of
incriminating articles "about the person." 74 Shoplifting statutes gener-
ally do not authorize a search of a suspect.75 The common law authority
for a private search is sparse and inconclusive.7
In view of the dearth of authority on search incident to a lawful
private arrest, some discussion of the issues involved seems appropriate.
As a general consideration, since the public police are intended to be
society's primary law enforcers, the limitations on public police search
should set the upper boundaries of allowable search by private police.77
The perimeters of permissible public police search are, of course, estab-
lished by the fourth amendment.7 8
ToRrs §§ 100-06, and comment d at 175; S.H. Kress & Co. v. Musgrove, 153 Va. 348, 149
S.E. 453 (1929). The right has apparently fallen into desuetude. MCPP No. 3, supra
note 65, at 27.
72 See text at notes 81-84 infra. Given the conclusion that private parties should have
a limited right to search a person incident to an arrest, particularly for self-defense,
there may be occasions when a cursory search of an area within the immediate reach of
the arrestee would be equally necessary to fulfill that purpose; for example, when the
arrestee is in a car. Chimel recognized this in the public police context. 395 U.S. at 763;
and see MCPP No. 3, supra note 65, at 36-37.
73 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1415 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 846 (1961); HAwAII
REv. LAws § 708-8 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-613 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. § 755.12
(1950); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.146 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-06-24 (1960); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 206 (1969); S.D. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 23-22-17 (1967).
74 MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.884 (1954); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2303 (Supp. 1968).
roth here and in note 73 supra, the statutes speak in terms of "about the person," which
might easily be read to allow a search of both the person and the area within his reach.
See note 72 supra. See also Tax. CODE CaIM. PROC. ANN. § 18-22 (1966), which has received
rather varied interpretation by the Texas courts. It seems fairly clear that search there-
under must be incident to a lawful arrest. Davis v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 421, 21 S.W.2d
509 (1929).
75 Texas appears to be the only exception. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1436e(2) (Supp.
1970). See generally Comment, Survey and Analysis of Tort and Criminal Aspects of
Shoplifting Statutes, 58 MicH. L. REv. 429, 447-49 (1960).
76 One jurisdiction apparently grants the right, People v. Santiago, 53 Misc. 2d 264, 278
N.Y.S.2d 260 (Rockland County Ct. 1967); People v. Williams, 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 281
N.Y.S.2d 251 (Syracuse City Ct. 1967), while another limits search to that authorized by its
search statute, People v. Martin, 225 Cal. App. 2d 91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1964). One case
has totally disallowed such a right. Application of Fried, 68 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
But cf. Agnello v. United States, 290 F. 671, 684 (2d Cir. 1923), rev'd in part, 269 U.S. 20
(1925); United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1963).
77 People v. Williams, 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 281 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Syracuse City Ct. 1967); see
Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (C.P. 1966). But cf. note 42 supra.
78 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
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The right of public police to conduct a warrantless personal search
is governed in part by Chimel v. California,79 which authorizes a post-
arrest search of a person and the area within his immediate control
where the policeman fears use of a dangerous weapon by the arrestee
or where he has reasonable cause to believe the search will turn up
destructible or easily concealed evidence.8 0 Search incident to an inves-
tigative "stop" or detention is considered in Terry v. Ohio,81 which au-
thorizes a "frisk" or external pat-down of clothing where the officer
fears that he or others may be in danger. If the frisk reveals the presence
of weapons, the officer may conduct a personal search to remove them.
When an articulable suspicion of danger exists, granting a private
policeman or citizen the authority to search for the purpose of finding
and seizing weapons of an arrestee, at least equivalent to the pat-down
approved by Terry, seems to be a necessary concomitant of the power
to arrest.82 Furthermore, since private police generally have no author-
ity to make an investigative detention or "stop" short of an arrest,83 it
is probably most sensible to grant a right of full personal search when
weapon use is feared. The difficult question is whether to allow a non-
consensual search to recover property for return to the owner or for
use as evidence. These proprietary and evidentiary concerns can usually
be satisfied by simply arresting the suspect and leaving search to the
public police. The argument that search of a suspect may enable the
parties to settle the matter without further recourse to the public police,
and thus avoid stigmatizing the suspect with an arrest record or crim-
inal conviction, ignores the possibility of arranging a valid consent
search. If the stolen property is easily destructible or concealable, how-
ever, and if there is a substantial likelihood that the thief will destroy
or conceal it before the public police arrive, an emergency search by
the guard may be justifiable.8 4 The right would be analogous to that
granted by Chimel, but might carefully be hedged by placing a strict
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." US. CONsr.
amend. IV.
79 595 U.S. 752 (1969); see MCPP No. 3, §§ 3.01-.04, Comments.
80 595 U.S. at 763.
81 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
82 The statutory materials directly support this proposition, supra note 73. If the
private party does arrest, and fears injury from the arrestee, it is doubtful that reason-
able civil or criminal penalties would deter search for weapons. On the other hand,
imposition of such penalties would force a citizen to arrest at his peril, hardly an in-
centive for private law enforcement.
83 See note 45 supra.




burden of proof on the searcher to demonstrate an absolute necessity
for the search.
B. Adequacy of Sanctions for Abuse of Search Power
In discussing both the adequacy of existing sanctions to control pri-
vate police search and the need for additional controls, it is useful to
distinguish search of the person incident to an arrest from surveillance
and private property searches. In the area of search incident to an
arrest, private police practice does not appear to exceed permissible
limits.8 5 The retail security guard generally does not search at all, rely-
ing instead on detention of a suspect until the arrival of public police,
who then handle recovery of the property. Agencies involved in other
types of police work-armored car service, for example-usually search
only when the presence of dangerous weapons is suspected. Search of a
more substantial nature is left to the public police.8 6 This lack of abuse
is due at least in part to a consideration discussed earlier-the desire
to maintain good public relations with customers and clients.8 7 Further-
more, deferral to public police is generally a viable alternative to self-
help in making a search incident to an arrest. Thus, it appears that the
threat of civil liability for trespass or assault and battery8s may be an
adequate deterrent to illegal private police conduct in this area. If par-
ticularly flagrant abuses arise, criminal sanctions for assault and battery
are available.
In contrast to private police search incident to an arrest, the existing
legal prohibitions on surveillance and private property search appear
to have little impact on certain forms of private-police activity. For
example, private investigators, utilized by both domestic and business
interests, commonly conduct illegal searches of dwellings8 9 and engage
85 See BuRNs HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 16, 18: "Always try to avoid physical con-
tact, including body search, when making an arrest. ... Searches [of the person] should
be made only when necessary .... " Cf. People v. Trimarco, 41 Misc. 2d 775, 245 N.YS.2d
795 (Sup. Ct. 1963). This and the generalizations which follow are in part the conclusions
reached from the interview-study of private police practice.
88 This is the pattern seen in industrial security, armored car service, and the in-
vestigative aspects of retail security. See R. Moamoiss; supra note 9, at 403-15.
87 See text at notes 47-49 supra.
88 1 F. HAPER & F. JAMTS, supra note 16, at §§ 3.1-3.5.
89 E.g., Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 44, 203 N.E.2d 481, 483, 255 N.YS.2d 83, 86
(1964) ("Proof of guilt collected in raids by private detectives has been . . . the basis
for thousands of divorce decrees in our State."); Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156,
221 N.E.2d 622 (C.P. 1966); REPORT ON PRIVATE DETEarIvF.s (1957), supra note 5, at 41;
Agency for Investigation and Detection, Inc. v. Dep't of State, 25 App. Div. 2d 738, 169
N.Y.S.2d 168 (1966); Bylin, Super Snooper, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 17, 1971, at 1, col.
1 [hereinafter cited as Wall Street Journal].
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in illicit surveillance activities, 0 primarily to obtain information for
use in a civil action or to influence some private decision or venture.91
The 1968 Crime Control Act prescribes both civil and criminal pen-
alties for violation of its surveillance provisions. 92 Most state statutes
which outlaw similar conduct prescribe at least criminal penalties. 3 In
addition, general civil and criminal sanctions for trespass are available
in cases of illegal property search,94 and civil sanctions for invasion of
privacy exist to control illegal surveillance. 95 Yet the industry practices
make it quite clear that these penalties are often inadequate to deal
with the problems. This failure may be due to a number of factors.
Because of their often surreptitious nature, these forms of search may
pass undetected.9G Moreover, since the search may often involve em-
barrassing or confidential subject matter, victims may be hesitant to
complain. 97 Finally, the information obtained through these forms of
search usually cannot be obtained by alternative legal methods or by
engaging public police aid.
However, the federal act98 and some of the state statutes9 9 outlawing
electronic surveillance provide a further sanction-evidence secured by
private parties in violation of the surveillance provisions may not be
90 See Commonwealth v. Murray, 423 Pa. 37, 223 A.2d 102 (1966); REPORT OF THE
NEv YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMiITrEE ON PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND LICENSURE
OF PRIVATE DETECTIVES 20-22 (1960); REPORT OF THE NEwv YORK STATE L.GISLATIVE Com-
MITEE ON PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND LICENSURE OF PRIVATE DETECTIVES 19-33
(1956); Wall Street Journal, supra note 89; SENATE REPORT, supra note 69, at 2154.
91 See REPORT ON PRIVATE DErsTVES (1957), supra note 5, at 57-58; 2 sources cited
note 89 supra. Private police agencies concerned with retail and industrial security, who
might use an illegal search to uncover evidence of employee misfeasance-see Wall
Street Journal, supra note 89; R. MoMaoissE, supra note 9, at 403-15; People v. Johnson,
153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 315 P.2d 468 (1957)-usually denied engaging in such activity.
This was not surprising, however, in view of the heavy penalties which often attend
such conduct. See text at notes 92-95 infra.
-92 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1964) provides than an offender "shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1964) pro-
vides for civil recovery of actual damages, if more than a prescribed liquidated sum,
and botl punitive damages and litigation costs.
93 See sources at note 70 supra. And see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-6 (Smith-Hurd
1964) providing for injunctive relief and both actual and punitive damages.
94 See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 16, at §§ 1.1-1.10 (1956).
95 W. PROSSER, supra note 68, at § 112, p. 833.
96 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 69, at 2156.
97 See REPORT ON PRIVATE DETECTIVES (1957), supra note 5, at 41, 57-58.
28 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (Supp. V, 1965-69) provides for exclusion in "any court, grand
jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other au-
thority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof ... See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 9, at 2184-85.
99 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-5 (Smith-Hurd 1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.680
(1969); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4506; ORE. REV. STAT. § 41.910 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 11-35-13 (Supp. 1970).
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introduced at judicial proceedings. It would seem that a similar exclu-
sionary rule should apply to the fruits of unauthorized property
searches, 00 since the dangers of abuse and the difficulties of control
seem identical. Although such a rule would have little impact on inva-
sions of privacy for the purpose of gathering information not to be used
in judicial proceedings, the effect on searches used to gather evidence
for divorce suits and other types of civil actions might be quite substan-
tial.1'0 The deterrent effect of exclusion at criminal trials is more diffi-
cult to assess, since private search is apparently rarely intended to gather
evidence for use at criminal trials.102
While it is unclear, then, whether legislative enactment of a criminal
exclusionary rule applicable to surveillance and property searches is
necessary, 03 it would seem that, even assuming state action, 10 4 a judicial
extension of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the fruits of
illegal private search is unwarranted. 10 5 The fourth amendment rule
renders evidence inadmissible in a criminal proceeding if law enforce-
ment officers obtained it as a result of an unconstitutional search. 106
Burdeau v. McDowell,07 decided by the Supreme Court in 1921, held
the rule inapplicable to private parties. The Court concluded that the
fourth amendment was intended to limit only governmental action.
While recent decisions have followed the reasoning of Burdeau,0 s
100 See TEx. CODE CRI. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (1966) (exclusion at any criminal trial
of evidence against an accused obtained by any person in violation of Texas law or the
federal Constitution); Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (C.P. 1966);
Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (1966) (exclusion of evidence
at a civil trial when illegally obtained by a private party); cf. Deiner v. Mid-American
Coaches, Inc., 378 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1964).
101 REPORT ON PRiVATE DErEcnvrs (1957), supra note 5, at 57-58.
102 But cf. Knoll Associates, Inc. v. Dixon, 232 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), and dis-
cussion at note 12 supra.
103 See text at notes 110-19 infra.
104 See text at notes 156-68 infra.
105 Some comment in the literature has argued that the rule be applied to private
police. Comment, Regulation of Private Police, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 540, 546-49 (1967);
Comment, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REv. 608
(1967).
106 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The rule also extends to search by private
parties where they act at the hire or under the direction of governmental officials.
E.g., Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968); Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d
967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1969); People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955).
107 256 U.S. 465 (1921). The Court has not since re-examined its position, though
certiorari was denied in People v. Radazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1964).
108 E.g., Wolf Low v. United States, 391 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1968); Barnes v. United
States, 373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.
1964); People v. Trimarco, 41 Misc. 2d 775, 245 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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some courts have limited the exclusionary rule to public police on the
additional ground that the rule would not deter illegal private con-
duct.109
The exclusionary rule represents a constitutional judgment that the
need to protect fourth amendment rights outweighs the need to use all
available evidence of guilt in criminal prosecutions. The Supreme
Court in Mapp v. Ohio"0 indicated that such a judgment depends upon
two related factual assumptions: (1) that the rule would deter police
violation of the fourth amendment,"' and (2) that the rule was in fact
the only effective deterrent." 2 Even with respect to public police the
validity of these assumptions is questionable. 113 In addition, some sug-
gested alternatives to the rule might be more effective. 14 Furthermore,
the rule deters only searches intended to obtain evidence for use in a
criminal prosecution. Thus, one reason assigned for the possible ineffec-
tiveness of the rule in the public police context is that many police
activities are not conviction oriented."15
Private police agencies appear to be even less conviction oriented
than the public police. They seem to be concerned primarily with pro-
tection of property and personnel and with investigation of internal
company business. Even the private investigator is rarely concerned
with criminal convictions; his activities, when judicial proceedings are
involved at all, are directed toward obtaining evidence for civil actions.
A civil exclusionary rule, therefore, would be a far more effective de-
terrent of illegal private police conduct than would an extension of
the fourth amendment criminal exclusionary rule." 6 Furthermore, at
least in the context of search incident to arrest, the threat of extensive
liability in tort and the economic pressure to maintain favorable public
109 E.g., People v. Radazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 1000 (1964); People v. Botts, 250 Cal. App. 2d 478, 58 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1967). See
also recent cases involving illegal foreign police search: Stonehill v. United States, 405
F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1968); Com-
monwealth v. Wallace, 356 Mass. 92, 248 N.E.2d 246 (1969).
110 376 U.S. 643 (1961).
1I Id. at 656.
112 Id. at 651-52; see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 220-21 (1960); People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 447, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12, 913 (1955). See generally Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 668-72
(1970).
113 See generally Oaks, supra note 112. Also see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1968).
114 Oaks, supra note 112, at 673-74.
115 The Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968), stated:
[]n some contexts the rule is ineffective as a deterrent. Street encounters
between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity . . . . En-
counters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of reasons, some of which
are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime.
See also Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
116 See text at notes 101-02 supra.
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relations may well be effective deterrents to private police miscon-
duct.117 Thus, neither Mapp assumption holds true for private police
activity,118 and, even assuming state action, application of a constitu-
tionally based exclusionary rule to private police search appears to be
unwarranted as a matter of policy.":9
IV. INTERROGATION
The right lawfully to detain a suspect is a necessary prerequisite of
effective interrogation; 120 without a right to detain, the suspect may
simply walk away, just as he might if asked an unpleasant question by
a fellow citizen. While there is no express authorization of private po-
lice interrogation during detention of a suspect,121 such interrogation
117 See text at notes 85-88 supra.
118 Note that this conclusion would not follow if Mapp were extended as a civil ex-
clusionary rule to private police search. This is essentially the mechanism employed by
the courts in Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (C.P. 1966), and
Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 805, 223 A.2d 217 (1966), to create judicially
a civil exclusionary rule. See note 100 supra. The problem with these cases is that
they are doctrinally unsound, however correct they may be from a policy standpoint.
Not only do they extend Mapp to private activity, in direct opposition to the trend of
the case law, notes 108-09 supra, but they extend Mapp to civil proceedings, though
that decision has been otherwise extended no farther than to quasi-criminal actions.
See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); Comment, The
Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil Cases, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 263 (1967).
Clearly the best solution is legislative enactment of such a civil rule, exemplified by the
existing statutes providing a limited civil exclusionary rule in the eavesdropping con-
text. See notes 98 & 99 supra.
'19 A criminal exclusionary rule in the private police area would be justifiable if
carefully drawn to include only those areas of conduct where it might have some de-
terrent effect, whether on public or private police:
[A] rigid and unthinking application of the exciusionary rule, in futile protest
against practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact
a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). From this standpoint, the Texas statutory ex-
clusionary rule, Tax. CODE CmRM. PRoc. ANN. art 38.23 (1965), may be too broadly drawn.
See note 100 supra. And see Oaks, supra note 112, at 754-57, which concludes that the
rule may be unjustifiable even in the public police area.
120 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), dealt with "the protection which must
be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected
to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added). The Court
termed such questioning "custodial interrogation." The detention requirement has been
emphasized by later decisions. See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969);
Mathis v. United States, 391 US. 1, 4-5 (1968). People v. Rodney P. (Anon.) 21 N.Y.2d
1, 233 NE.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S2d 255 (1967). Note also the shoplifting statutes, which
often grant a right to detain "for questioning." E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231 § 94-B
(Supp. 1971) and sources at notes 44 & 45 supra.
121 Every citizen has "the liberty . . . to address questions to other persons, for
ordinarily the person addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk
away. . . " Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). When
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may be justified as a matter of policy. The detention following a shop-
lifting arrest presents the typical situation in which a private policeman
may want to interrogate a suspect. 22 The guard or his supervisor may
wish either to persuade the suspect to settle the matter on friendly terms
by returning the missing property, or to determine if the situation jus-
tifies summoning the public police. The supervisor may also wish to
obtain a confession from the shoplifter for use in a criminal prosecution
or as a defense to a later action for false arrest. However, none of these
justifications, nor the right to detain the suspect, implies any authority
to use coercive tactics to compel the suspect to answer questions during
an interrogation. 23
Private police generally do not abuse their right to interrogate. Typ-
ically, a shoplifting suspect is taken to the office of the security super-
visor 24 and questioned in the presence of the arresting guard. 25 Often
the suspect is informed of his right to remain silent and right to coun-
sel. 26 Since post-arrest detention is usually permitted for only a brief
questioning is incident to a detention, however, that liberty becomes less clear. In the
public police context, Miranda allows questioning by police only if the suspect has
readily assented (assuming counsel is not present).
122 E.g., State v. Valpredo, 75 Wash. 2d 868, 450 P.2d 979 (1969); People v. Williams,
53 Misc. 2d 1086, 281 N.YS.2d 251 (Syracuse City Ct. 1967); People v. Crabtree, 239 Cal.
App. 2d 789, 49 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1966).
123 This -is true in both the public and private police contexts. Compulsion by the
public police in interrogating a suspect is strictly prohibited by the fifth amendment
as read by Miranda (though exclusion at trial is the only penalty). See also Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Specific criminal penalties are also often imposed on public
police. E.g., TEx. PEN. CODE art. 1157 (1961). Similarly, private police are subject to
criminal penalties as well as liability in tort. See note 128 infra. Authority to compel
testimony exists only where a governmental agency can guarantee immunity from pros-
ecution to the party from whom testimony is sought. See, e.g., I K. DAvis, AuMINisnRA-
TIvE LAw TREATisE § 3.08 (1958); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2281-82 (McNaughton ed.
1961); Garrity v. New Jersey, 885 U.S. 493 (1967); cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967).
124 See the guard manual cited in Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 409 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1966)
("In stores in which office is within view of sales floor it is advisable to take shoplifter
to stockroom, employees' restroom, or other place . .. .'); and sources at note 122 supra.
125 State v. Valpredo, 75 Wash. 2d 368, 450 P.2d 979 (1969), is an example of the
typical handling of a shoplifting case. And see State v. Masters, 154 N.W.2d 133 (Iowa
1967).
126 E.g., State v. Valpredo, 75 Wash. 2d 368, 450 P.2d 979 (1969). Private parties are
not constitutionally required to give the Miranda warnings. See text at notes 131-34
infra. Nevertheless, a substantial sector of the industry requires its operatives to give
the Miranda warnings at the inception of all arrests or detentions, often despite specific
advice of counsel to the contrary. Interview with a Director of Retail Security, in Chi-
cago, Ill., Jan. 6, 1971 (name withheld by request). A variant on this pattern is that
the agencies require the warnings to be given in localities where the district attorney
has interpreted Miranda as applying equally to private and public law enforcement
personnel. Interview with a Director of Retail Security, Chicago, IMI., Dec. 6, 1970 (name
withheld by request). A leading authority in the field of retail security has written:
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period,127 there is less likelihood than in public police interrogations
that coercive methods will be effective to extract a confession. Unrea-
sonable extensions of the period of detention and use of force and
threats are discouraged by previously discussed economic factors and
by tort and criminal sanctions. 28 Nevertheless, the question often arises
whether particular confessions should be admissible in a criminal trial
of the confessor-suspect.
Exclusion of an improperly obtained confession may be based on
purely evidentiary grounds: a coerced or involuntary confession may
be unreliable. 129 This rule has shown considerable vitality in the pri-
vate police context,1 0 although the recent trend in evidence law which
favors the admission of all probative evidence 31 may point toward a
diminishing role for this rule in the future.
In the public police context, a much more pervasive exclusionary
I have discussed this problem with District Attorneys in six states . . . and
found every one of them supported the belief that the Supreme Court ruling
[Miranda] is an interpretation of the rights of ALL citizens and therefore is
directed just as much at so-called "private police" as at public law enforce-
ment.... [A]s a consultant to the National Crime Commission I have had op-
portunity to discuss this situation with men connected with the commission
and they also can see no reason for assuming the Supreme Court guidelines do
not apply equally to private and public law enforcement personnel.
Letter from S.J. Curtis, author of MODERN RET Am SECUrTY (1968), to Eric T. Lodge,
Dec. 16, 1966, on file in the University of Southern California Law Library, excerpt re-
printed in Comment, Regulation of Private Police, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 540, 546 n.36
(1967). In any event, awareness of Miranda seems high among supervisors of private
police organizations.
127 The rights of a guard or his employer to detain after an arrest or by detention
under a shoplifting statute are strictly limited, typically to detention in "a reasonable
manner and for a reasonable time." See note 45 supra. In retail security practice, the
public police are usually called immediately after the detention or arrest. Interviews
with Retail Security Directors, Chicago, IM., Dec. 6, 1970, and Jan. 6, 1971 (names with-
held by request).
128 An overlong detention subjects the arrestor to liability for false imprisonment.
See note 40 supra. Use of threats or force is discouraged not only by standard criminal
sanctions for assault, battery, and intimidation, but also by specific provisions in some juris-
dictions prohibiting private coercion of confessions. E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 199.460
(1967); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1-10 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-7 (Smith-
Hurd 1964).
129 See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 821-30 (1940).
130 E.g., Mefford v. State, 235 Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824 (1964); State v. Christopher, 10
Ariz. App. 169, 457 P.2d 356 (1969); People v. Frank, 52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d 570
(Sup. Ct. 1966). And see Comment, Confessions Obtained Through Interrogations Con-
ducted by Private Persons, Investigators, and Security Agents, 4 WILLAMESrE L.J. 262,
266-68 (1966). There are also statutory enactments of the rule. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 634.03 (1947); N.Y. CODE CRIm. PROC. § 395; TEX. CODE Cams. PROC. § 38.21 (1966),
§ 38.22 (Supp. 1970).
131 See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass. 1950); Weinstein, Probative Force
of Hearsay, 46 IOwA L. REv. 331 (1961).
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rule is applied. Under Miranda v. Arizona,132 any incriminating or
exculpatory statement obtained from a criminal suspect during a cus-
todial interrogation 33 is inadmissible at his trial, unless prior to his
statement the suspect was effectively advised of and knowingly waived
his fifth amendment right to remain silent and his sixth amendment
right to counsel. 34
Post-Miranda decisions have limited the rule to interrogations by
police, governmental officials, and private police commissioned under
state or local law.' 35 Interrogations by non-commissioned private police
generally have been distinguished on the factual assumption that pri-
vate-party interrogations are without the inherent "potentiality for
compulsion" which the Miranda Court found in the public police con-
text.136 The courts adopting this assumption may have felt that an
extension of Miranda to private police was unwarranted in view of the
rarity of private police abuse and the inability of Miranda to deter prac-
tices not motivated by a desire to convict. 13 Furthermore, a few courts
132 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Recent commentary on the decision is extensive. See I.J.
FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 266-84 (1967); Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents:
Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test,
65 MiCH. L. REv. 59 (1966). See generally the bibliography in L WINREm, CRIMINAL
Paocess 770-74 (1969).
133 See note 120 supra.
134 384 U.S. at 444-45. Dissatisfaction with Miranda, primarily because of its restrictive
effect on law enforcement, see SENATE REPORT, supra note 69, at 2123-53, has led to a
legislative attempt to overrule the decision. In 1968, as part of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (Supp. V, 1965-69) in
an attempt to return to pre-Miranda admissibility law. See text at notes 138-40 infra.
The courts have not yet confronted the conflict, but as to its possible outcome, see
Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 81. Moreover,
it appears that the Burger Court views the fifth amendment in a somewhat less in-
dulgent light than did its predecessor. See Harris v. New York, 39 U.S.L.W. 4281 (US.
Feb. 24, 1971), holding, 5-4, that a confession from a suspect obtained in violation of
Miranda might be used against him at a later trial to impeach his credibility on the
stand.
135 Pratt v. State, 9 Md. 220, 263 A.2d 247 (1970) (holding that a citizen acting under
a special police commission was subject to the Miranda requirements; see Common-
wealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968) (interrogation of a boy by his mother
held subject to the Miranda requirements when she was acting at the insistence and in
the presence of a law enforcement officer). For other "private" parties who may be
subject to Miranda requirements, see Procunier v. Atchley, 39 U.S.L.W. 4125 (U.S. Jan.
19, 1971); People v. Polk, 63 Cal. 2d 443, 406 P.2d 641, 47 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965); People
v. Frank, 52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See generally Annot., Cus-
todial Interrogation-Miranda Rule, 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).
.13 E.g., Shaumberg v. State, 83 Nev. 372, 432 P.2d 500 (1967); State v. Christopher,
10 Ariz. App. 169, 457 P.2d 356 (1969); see cases compiled in Comment, Admissi-
bility of Confessions or Admissions of Accused Obtained During Custodial Interrogation
by Non-Police Personnel, 40 Miss. L.J. 139 (1968).
137 Courts have recognized this distinction in other fields. See the cases in note 109
supra dealing with the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. One of those cases, Coin-
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suggest that private police interrogations are not protected by the fifth
and sixth amendments since nongovernmental agencies are involved
and no state action exists. 138 This last distinction is perhaps the only
persuasive argument in favor of limiting the operation of Miranda to
public police; the former distinctions may well be unsound.
Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of confessions made to govern-
mental officers was controlled by a "voluntariness" doctrine resting on
the fourteenth amendment. 139 If it appeared from the facts surrounding
a confession that it had been coercively obtained, the confession was
excluded at trial as violative of due process. This decisional law repre-
sented the response of the Supreme Court to a long history of public
police abuse,140 and the black-letter standards of Miranda may be
viewed as the culmination of the Court's efforts to control public police
interrogation conduct. Moreover, the Miranda Court was probably re-
sponding to a tendency of the lower courts to condone conduct which
the Court felt violated standards of procedural fairness.141 Thus, to a
considerable extent, Miranda was designed to deter public police abuse.
Given this view of the decision, an extension of Miranda to private
police interrogations would seem, as a matter of policy, unnecessary. As
demonstrated by the apparent rarity of private police abuse in this area,
the threat of civil and criminal liability, the fear of declining business,
and the possibility of confession exclusion under evidence law seem
adequate to deter most private police abuses.
Deterrence of police abuse, however, may not have been the only
rationale underlying the Miranda decision.142 The marked shift in pro-
monwealth v. Wallace, 356 Mass. 92, 248 N.E.2d 246 (1969), also recognized this dis-
tinction in the Miranda context. See discussion at note 142 infra.
138 See Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir. 1966); People v. Frank, 52
Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
139 E.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 US. 519 (1968); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534 (1961); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). See generally Paulsen, The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411 (1954).
140 384 U.S. at 445-49; see IV NATIONAL COM'N ON LA-W OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCE-
MENT, REPORT ON LAWLSSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) (Wichersham Comm'n Re-
port); Booth, Confessions, and Methods Employed in Procuring Them, 4 S. CAL. L. Rxv.
83 (1930).
141 Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change,
37 U. CINN. L. REV. 671, 710-11 (1968). See, e.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519
(1968); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967). Moreover, Judge Friendly cites a growing
mistrust in the Court of police honesty. Friendly, supra, at 711. See also Kitch, The
Supreme Court's Code of Criminal Procedure: 1968-1969 Edition, 1969 Sup. Cr. REV.
155, 159-60.
142 Contra, Oaks, supra note 112, at 671 ("deterrence was the 'single and distinct'
purpose" of the Miranda decision); and see Commonwealth v. Wallace, 356 Mass. 92,
248 N.E.2d 246 (1969). In that case foreign police officials had obtained a statement of
guilt from the defendant without properly warning him of his rights as required by
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cedural standards from a "voluntary" confession to one obtained only
after a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of rights143 and the emphasis
on protection of fifth amendment rights' 41 suggest that the Court in
Miranda was concerned also with erecting new protections for indi-
vidual constitutional rights.
This aspect of Miranda was emphasized by the Supreme Court of
California in People v. Kelley,145 which reversed a state court convic-
tion of a serviceman based, in part, on a confession secured by a military
investigator without the proper Miranda warnings. Despite the legality
of the confession under military law,146 and even though recognizing
that the decision might not deter military police practices, the court
held the confession inadmissible:
One of the important purposes of the [confession] rules . .
was that it was necessary to deter improper police practices...
that might lead to involuntary confessions [citations omitted].
But it cannot be denied that the whole series of cases-Esco-
bedo, ... Miranda, Johnson, . . . and their numerous prog-
eny-was fundamentally aimed at protecting the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights of the accused, that is, to protect
against self-incrimination and to protect the right to counsel. 147
Miranda. The confession was subsequently introduced in evidence against the confessor
in a state-side criminal proceeding. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the
confession was properly admitted since foreign police practice would not be affected
or deterred by an extraterritorial extension of Miranda. On Wallace, see United States
v. Nagelberg (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 1970). But cf. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
143 384 U.S. at 475.
144 "The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitu-
tional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning . . . so simple, we will not
pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights
without a warning being given." Id. at 468.
145 66 Cal. 2d 232, 424 P.2d 947, 57 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1967). See also Bran v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); United States v. Miller, 261 F. Supp. 442 (D. Del. 1965).
146 The California Supreme Court might have assumed otherwise had the case come
up on appeal after the decision in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), where the
Supreme Court limited military court criminal jurisdiction to cases which were "service
connected." Id. at 272. In any event, the confession in Kelley would be admissible before
a military tribunal. Military law does not afford a pretrial right to counsel, nor is that
right guaranteed to service personnel by the federal Constitution. 66 Cal. 2d at 248-49,
424 P.2d at 960, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
147 Id. at 250, 424 P.2d at 961, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 377. This conclusion finds support in
People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 427 P.2d 772, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1967), appeal dis-
missed, 390 U.S. 529 (1968), where the California Supreme Court held that a criminal
defendant could not object to use at his trial of a confession obtained from a third
party by public police in violation of Miranda standards. The court recognized that
the defendant would have had standing to object if the evidence sought to be introduced
had been secured in violation of the fourth amendment, since the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule was designed primarily to deter illegal police search. But the court
rejected the defendant's argument that protection of the fifth amendment privilege af-
forded by Miranda required analogous treatment:
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Thus the Warren Court may have been concerned not only with un-
constitutional police abuses encouraged by the privacy and conviction
orientation of public police interrogations, but with the inherently co-
ercive capacity of those interrogations, which jeopardized effective ex-
ercise of the fifth and sixth amendment rights of an ignorant or fearful
suspect.148 The Miranda warnings may therefore have been intended,
at least in part, to dispel this fear and ignorance.
The principal factual distinctions between private and public police
interrogations seem to be the strictly limited period of permissible pri-
vate police detention and the unofficial, or informal, character of the
questioning.14 9 However, numerous post-Miranda decisions indicate
that neither a short period of detention 50 nor the absence of recognized
official character' 51 is sufficient to dispel the taint of compulsion in a
custodial interrogation. Moreover, these distinctions are largely negated
by the similarities between public and private interrogations-both in-
volve detention, privacy, the appearance of authority, and the avail-
ability to the interrogator of psychologically coercive methods of ques-
Non-coercive questioning is not in itself unlawful, however, and the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights protected by . . . Miranda are violated only when
evidence obtained without the required warnings and waiver is introduced
against the person whose questioning produced the evidence.
66 Cal. 2d at 812, 427 P.2d at 775, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
For other authorities suggesting that Miranda was intended to do more than deter
police abuse, see Harris v. New York, 39 U.S.L.W. 4281, 4294-95 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); letter cited in note 126 supra; Note, Evidence Taken in Viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment and Statements Taken in Violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment Held Admissible in a Domestic Court When Secured by Foreign Police, 56 VA. L.
REy. 335 (1970).
148 Judge Friendly characterizes this new protection of the fifth and sixth amend-
ments as "a ground bass that resounds throughout the Miranda opinion." Friendly,
supra note 141, at 711. His idea is that the Warren Court sought equal protection of
the sixth amendment and the fifth amendment privilege "by advancing the point at
which the privilege became applicable and surrounding the poor man with safeguards
in the way of warning and counsel that would put him more nearly on a par with the
rich man and the professional criminal." Id. at 711.
149 The argument here is that the suspect is aware that he is dealing with private
parties and hence feels less compelled to answer questions than if his interrogators were
public police. Factors which might dispel this informal atmosphere would be the pres-
ence of uniformed guards, a clear statement of intention by the interrogator that crim-
inal prosecution is likely, or the suspect's awareness that the public police are on the
way, typically the case in the shoplifting context. On the uniform question see People
v. Wright, 249 Cal. App. 2d 692, 694, 57 Cal. Rptr. 781, 782 n.1 (1967).
150 E.g., Orozco v. Texas, 894 U.S. 324 (1969); United States v. Pierce, 397 F.2d 128
(4th Cir. 1968). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966): "The circumstances
surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of
[a suspect] ......
151 See Mathis v. United States, 891 US. 1 (1968); Procunier v. Atchley, 89 U.S.L.W.
4125 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1971); People v. Arguello, 13 Cal. 2d 566, 407 P.2d 661, 47 Cal. Rptr.
485 (1965).
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tioning.15 2 All of these factors were relied upon in Miranda.15 These
similarities suggest that a significantly coercive atmosphere exists in the
context of many private police interrogations, and that suspects, un-
warned of their rights, may waive them through fear or ignorance.
Moreover, extension of Miranda to private police would probably have
a definite impact on their practices, since private police interrogation,
in contrast to search or arrest, may be relatively conviction oriented.15 4
Thus, as a matter of policy, an extension of both the procedural safe-
guards and exclusionary sanction' 55 of Miranda to private police inter-
rogations may well be warranted.
The extension of Miranda, however, depends upon one further con-
sideration-whether private police interrogations constitute state ac-
tion.'50 One possible basis for finding state action concerns the issuance
of commissions. 157 This approach was adopted by the Supreme Court
in Williams v. United States.15s The Lindsley Lumber Company had
suffered numerous thefts and hired petitioner, who held a special po-
lice officer card from the City of Miami and operated a detective agency,
to ascertain the identity of the thieves. In the course of his investiga-
152 See Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 436, 448-54 (1966), and sources cited therein.
Id. at 448 n.8. See also F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS
24-117 (1967). A point developed earlier, note 6 supra, and deserving of further notice
here, is that private police often have an extensive background in public law enforce-
ment, particularly at the supervisory level. Furthermore, under present industry prac-
tice, field interrogations are generally the province of these supervisors alone. Burns
Interview, supra note 46; Interviews with Retail Security Directors, Chicago, Ill., Dec.
6, 1970, and Jan. 6, 1971. BuRNs HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 18: "[Guard] duties do
not include investigating persons committing crimes, except to the extent that oral
questioning may be necessary .... It would appear, then, that private police interroga-
tion is often conducted with a level of inquisitorial skill and experience analogous to
that displayed in the conduct of public police interrogations.
153 384 US. at 449-58.
154 A desire to effect a peaceable return of stolen property without involving the
public police would seem to be the only motive for an interrogation not involving a
desire to obtain a confession for use in court. This is in marked contrast to a search or
arrest, which clearly serve the aims of property protection aside from conviction goals.
Furthermore, the industry practice of administering the Miranda warnings, supra note
126, is highly suggestive of a conviction orientation in private police interrogations. In
many localities, the prosecuting attorney will refuse to prosecute a suspect to whom
the warnings had not been given at the time of arrest. This is the underlying reason
for administration of the Miranda warnings by at least one large retail security agency.
Interview with a Director of Retail Security, in Chicago, Ill., Jan. 6, 1971 (name with-
held by request).
155 It is unlikely that the courts would enforce administration of the Miranda warn-
ings by liability in tort. This step has not been taken even in the public police context.
See Allen v. Eicher, 295 F. Supp. 1184, 1185-86 (D. Md. 1969) (". . . Miranda does not
per se make an interrogation which violates its precepts into an actionable tort").
150 See text and notes at notes 137 & 138 supra.
157 See text at notes 22-25 supra.
158 341 US. 97 (1951).
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tion, petitioner imprisoned, beat, and brutally coerced confessions from
four suspects. The Court upheld petitioner's conviction under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,11 9 finding that his acts were performed under
"color" of state law.160 In a 1970 decision, a Maryland court extended
the strictures of Miranda to commissioned private police.161 The court
held that the commission and its attendant powers made the private
guard ". . . a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of
Miranda."'1 62 Thus, there appears to be some authority for finding state
action in the conduct of commissioned private policemen.
Similarly, there may be authority for finding state action in interro-
gations by private police who are licensed under state or local law. This
rationale has been used already to include within the strictures of the
fourteenth amendment the discriminatory practices of licensed com-
mercial establishments which cater to the public. 6 3 In such cases it was
found that the "pervasive" regulation by the state warranted applica-
tion of the fourteenth amendment.6 4 This rationale may be applicable
also where the state licenses private individuals to perform specialized
police activities.
The scope of state action in the private police context may not, how-
ever, be so limited. In Marsh v. Alabama,6 5 the Supreme Court held
that when a state permits a private business to perform all the functions
of a municipal corporation, the public activities of the business consti-
tute state action. The routine participation of private police in certain
areas of law enforcement may sometimes supplant the public police, 166
and to this extent private police are performing a public function. It
is also apparent that private police coordinate their activities with the
public police, and while the suggestion of a loose partnership may be
too strong, private police are at least aware that the fruits of their in-
vestigations may be desired by the public police. Thus, although pri-
vate police perform only limited public functions, the rationale of
Marsh suggests that when the state permits private police activities, it
may endow these activities with state action.
Aside from the governmental character of these functions, there is
159 18 US.C. § 242 (1964).
160 341 US. at 99.
161 Pratt v. State, 9 Md. App. 220, 263 A.2d 247 (1970).
162 Id. at 249.
163 E.g., Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1970). And see Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157, 182-85 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
267, 281-83 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
164 Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593, 599 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
165 326 US. 501 (1946).
166 See notes 4 & 12 supra.
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the additional factor that private police activities often affect the gen-
eral public. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Lo-
gan Valley Plaza, Inc.,16 7 which extended Marsh to protect peaceful
picketing of a privately owned shopping center, the Supreme Court
considered the state action element in commercial establishments which
cater to the general public:
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it.168
Thus state action may be present in the activity of a security guard
employed by a privately owned shopping center, or by any private
organization which deals with the general public. This rationale sug-
gests that whenever private police activity affects a relatively broad
spectrum of the public, state action is present and hence the Miranda
requirements may apply to some private police interrogations.
CONCLUSION
Private police enjoy extensive powers which enable them to perform
functions analogous to public police activity. In the area of arrest these
powers are clearly defined, and for the most part require little modifica-
tion. The search and interrogation powers of private police are in some
cases more ambiguous, and here legislative delineation may be appro-
priate. Whether additional sanctions should be placed on the exercise
'of these powers depends upon the nature and extent of private police
abuses and the deterrent effect of existing sanctions. While certain
parallels between private and public police at least suggest that similar
sanctions should apply to both, this preliminary inquiry indicates that
the motivations and incentives of private police differ from their public
counterparts, and that blanket application of public police sanctions
to private police appears unwarranted. However, courts and commen-
tators alike should be sensitive to the possibility that the existing powers
and controls of private police may require alteration.
167 391 U.S. 808 (1968).
168 Id. at 825, quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
